> We simply didn't expect the Japanese to attack Hawai. guam, Wake Island, > the Philippines, and even alaska were easier to reach targets. We were dumb and arrogant. In naval battles the fleet and bases are all that matters. The last thing they needed was a fully formed up Plan Orange battle line sitting astride their supply lines as they headed towards whatever. Nope, it had to be the fleet or nothing. > There can't be anymore Pearl Harbors since the capital of the U.S. Pacific > Fleet has been moved back to San Diego. Roosevelt moved it to Pearl Harbor > in order to send a message of strength to the Japanese and effectively put > it in striking range. also, the U.S. keeps most of its fleet out of port > now anyways. Oh dear. We certainly CAN be Pearl Harbored again. We keep ships going 50-60% of the time, but there are only so many bases that can service carriers and so many subs we can successfully track. Wake-homing torpedoes, Shkvals, SSN19 Shipwreck missiles, heavy minelaying and the usual cruise missiles could do quite a bit to hurt the USN. Heck, a few well-placed modern AT missiles should be able to disable anything Aegis or smaller. No it won't be the whole fleet all at once but the effect could be the same. Then there is what happens when nukes are used at sea. LGH should teach everybody that there is no such thing as an impregnable anything. There's 'pretty darned difficult' and 'not worth the cost' but that's different from 'it can't happen again'. > Actually, the Japanese made several major errors at Pearl Harbor. They > failed to destroy the sub, fueling, or reapir facilties. four of the eight > battleships hit were repaired. and the Japanese commander Nagumo tended to > defer to his aide whom was extremely cautious. And the Japanese carrier > squadron didn't try to find the american carriers. Agreed on the infrastructure- in fact one could argue the base should have been the more important target and the ships could wait until they could be sunk on the high seas with greater crew losses and no chance of salvage. Japanese caution was largely due to fuel considerations. It was combat maneuvering or go home, not both. > In LOGH terms, you give a surprise attack to an aggressive commander like > Mittermeyer or even Bittenfeld and not a cautious commander. Ahhh, now THERE is a board topic- how would WWII go with the LGH cast members in place of the historical figures? Reinhard as a populist Prussian general that the Germans warm up to as opposed to Hitler's nationalistic terror machine, and Yang as an American admiral? Costarring Phezzan as a kind of Swiss Illuminati.